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In 2014, CBO reported health care expenditures consumed nearly 10 percent of the 
overall defense budget in 2012, up from 4 percent in 1990. Jansen, of the Congressional 
Research Service, noted in 2014 that moral hazard is considered one of the drivers of 
these increased costs; moral hazard results from lower out-of-pocket expenses. 
Adjustments to the administration of health benefits within DOD may reduce the DHP 
budget. Implementation of a basic allowance for health care (BAHC) for active duty 
dependents and retirees to use with a high deductible health plan (HDHP) and health 
savings account may provide incentives to use more cost-effective levels of care. The 
price elasticity of demand for health care is used to determine potential savings as the 
result of increased costs associated with the HDHP. The implementation of a BAHC is 
also examined from the point of view of the beneficiary to evaluate how they might 
respond to the changing incentives. This research found that while the plans are likely to 
invoke behavioral responses among beneficiaries and reduce moral hazard, unless they 
are widely adopted throughout the DOD they are unlikely to generate substantial cost 
savings as a percentage of current levels of spending. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MILITARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
Since the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
(CHAMPUS) was formed in 1966, the system has increased in size and cost. The 
extension of benefits to dependents was meant to aid retention and improve morale 
within the military services (Whipple & Maassen, 1975, p. 17). However, as the 
expenditure on health care within the United States has increased, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) has found that the share of those expenditures borne by service 
members and retirees has remained relatively flat and substantially lower than that of 
their civilian counterparts (CBO, 2014, p. 24). 
Various legislative decisions have continued to expand the benefits available to 
TRICARE beneficiaries. As an example, the early 2000s saw elimination of copays for 
active duty family members, as well as the introduction of TRICARE-for-Life (TFL), a 
free supplemental benefit to any Medicare-eligible military retiree current on their 
Medicare premiums without any offsetting cost increases to beneficiaries. Only the 
increase in TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for retirees in 2012 has directly addressed 
increasing the cost of benefits borne by beneficiaries as Congress has resisted increasing 
beneficiary cost sharing or reducing the level of service available to service members 
(CBO, 2014, p. 24). 
The TRICARE insurance system consists of three primary options for 
beneficiaries: Prime, Standard and Extra. These three options account for approximately 
66 percent of the eligible TRICARE population (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). Other 
programs supporting the rest of the beneficiary population include TFL, TRICARE 
Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select and TRICARE Retired Reserve (Defense Health 
Agency, 2014c). TRICARE Prime is free for active duty family members. Retirees and 
retiree families using TRICARE Prime pay annual premiums of $273.84 per individual or 
$547.68 per family, and have copays ranging from $0 to $40 (Defense Health Agency, 
2014a, p. 5). Aside from these charges, there is no fee for service obtained within the 
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Prime network, which is made up of military treatment facilities and certain civilian 
providers (Defense Health Agency, 2014a). 
TRICARE Standard and Extra have no annual premiums and have annual 
deductibles of $150 or $300 depending on the enrollee’s status (Defense Health Agency, 
2014b). Standard and Extra coinsurance rates, or the share of the cost borne by the 
beneficiary once their annual deductible has been reached, are between 15 percent and 25 
percent (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). Both plans have catastrophic caps, the 
maximum annual out of pocket (OOP) expense a beneficiary is required to pay, of $1,000 
or $3,000, again depending on the enrollee’s status (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). 
TRICARE Standard and Extra are available to active duty family members, retirees, and 
retiree family members. Generally, for either TRICARE Standard or TRICARE Extra the 
cost is less than comparable civilian plans. For example, CBO found the average annual 
costs for a family using TRICARE Standard / Extra in 2012 were $1,035, while a 
comparable civilian plan had annual costs of $5,565 (2014, p. 15). All three primary 
TRICARE plans are discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter. 
B. PROBLEM 
The cost of health care borne by active duty dependents, retirees, and retiree 
dependents has remained at levels below those of comparable civilian plans (CBO, 2014, 
p. 15). Over the past 15 years, the share of health care expenditures covered by 
beneficiaries under TRICARE has fallen from 27 percent to 11 percent while civilian cost 
sharing has continued to climb in line with national health expenditures (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014d, pp. 5–10). Moral hazard results when 
individuals take more risks or overuse resources because another party bears the burden 
of those actions. One could argue the current medical benefits structure provides little 
incentive for beneficiaries to think about how much and how often they are consuming 
health benefits, potentially leading to moral hazard. The past ten years have seen 
legislation expanding benefits to beneficiaries, but limited legislation to ensure that 
beneficiaries bear a portion of the burden via increased cost share mechanisms (CBO, 
2014). If the military health care system continues to use an increasing portion of the 
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defense budget, there may be real effects on the department’s ability to fund other 
requirements. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the current TRICARE system incentive 
structure for active duty dependents, retirees, and retiree family members, and evaluate 
that incentive structure against a proposed system consisting of a Basic Allowance for 
Health Care (BAHC) coupled with a high deductible health policy (HDHP) and a health 
savings account (HSA). The goal of the proposed system is twofold. First, the 
introduction of HDHPs and HSAs as a TRICARE option coupled with a BAHC will raise 
costs for the average beneficiary, which should reduce demand for health services and 
lower aggregate costs for the Department of Defense (DOD) through a combination of a 
reduction in moral hazard supported by higher beneficiary cost sharing. Second, the 
BAHC places funds directly into the hands of beneficiaries, which should alter their 
decision making process. Because funds are allowed to accumulate over time in the HSA, 
and ultimately transfer with the individual when he or she departs the service, they 
provide a means for unused benefits to accrue to the individual. This may help reduce the 
effects of the increased health care costs because unused benefits were previously 
unavailable to the beneficiary. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In what ways do selection bias, moral hazard and adverse selection affect the 
effects of the proposed plan? Can the implementation of a BAHC, coupled with a HDHP 
and a HSA, reduce the quantity of health care demanded and thus the cost of health care 
to the DOD? The examination of current TRICARE beneficiary trends is used to evaluate 
how beneficiaries may respond to changing incentives. This examination looks to gain 
insights regarding potential future modifications to the health care benefit to keep it 
financially sustainable. 
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E. CONDUCT OF STUDY 
The study begins by reviewing the history of the military health care system for 
beneficiaries to determine the economic effects of the proposed BAHC. Data was 
gathered from the 2014 Evaluation of the TRICARE System concerning the current costs 
to active duty dependents, retirees, and retiree dependents within the TRICARE system to 
determine the potential pool for savings (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). The same 
report was used to determine current levels of demand and the cost per unit of that 
demand. This data was then applied across a range of potential values of price elasticity 
of demand to quantify potential savings among various adoption rates. Selection bias, 
moral hazard reduction and adverse selection and their effects are then discussed. 
Accepted values for elasticity and adoption rates for HDHPs found in the literature 
(Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, & Marquis, 1987; Eichner, 1998) were 
applied to the proposed program to determine its potential to reduce quantity demanded 
and lower costs within the DOD Military Health System (MHS). 
Chapter II provides the historical background of the MHS as it pertains to access 
to care for active duty family members, retirees and, retiree family members. The chapter 
identifies changes to the system over time regarding access to care and how these 
beneficiaries responded to those changes. 
Chapter III provides the current cost structure of the TRICARE program for 
active duty family members, retirees, and retiree family members. The chapter identifies 
the cost drivers impacting the TRICARE beneficiary population and compares those cost 
drivers to the proposed costs drivers of the new BAHC program. 
Chapter IV is a review of the academic literature to determine relevant values for 
price elasticity of demand, selection bias, moral hazard reduction, and adverse selection. 
Baiker, Dow and Wolfson (2006) determined values for factors affecting the potential of 
a BAHC combined with a HDHP and HSA based upon the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment (HIE) conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Chapter V analyzes a possible result from implementation of the proposed 
TRICARE HDHP option. The chapter covers the concept and design of the BAHC and 
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how it affects the cost sharing burden of beneficiaries compared to TRICARE Prime, 
Standard and Extra. The analysis then turns to the expected adoption rates based upon 
data culled from the academic literature to determine the proposed plan’s viability as a 
cost reduction option. 
Chapter VI evaluates the proposed HDHP from the standpoint of the beneficiary 
and provides a case study for expected beneficiary response to the new spending profile. 
The differences between the TRICARE Standard beneficiary spending profile and the 
hypothetical HDHP beneficiary spending profile are discussed. 
Chapter VII summarizes the research conducted and identifies areas for further 
study where potential savings may exist. 
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II. HISTORY OF MEDICAL COVERAGE FOR SERVICE 
MEMBERS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Health insurance coverage had become a large part of labor compensation 
packages in the 1950s as a result of the tax-exempt status of premiums from income and 
payroll taxation (Baiker et al., 2006, p. 463). The United States Congress passed the 
Dependents’ Medical Care Act (1956), providing service members’ dependents, retirees, 
and retiree dependents access to medical care at military treatment facilities (MTFs). 
Once Congress passed the Dependents’ Medical Care Act, the military health care system 
began having a second mission. The first mission was and is ensuring the medical 
readiness of active duty service members during a time of war. The second mission is 
attending to the needs of active duty members during times of peace, as well as those of 
their dependents, retirees, and retiree dependents during times of war and peace (Dolfini-
Reed & Jebo, 2000, p. 1). 
B. HISTORY 
Prior to 1956, active duty service members received priority care at MTFs and 
their dependents were seen only on a space-available basis (Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000, 
p. 5). Following the Dependents’ Medical Care Act passage, MTFs also became available 
to retirees, and retiree dependents. Services provided to active duty dependents and 
retirees, and retiree dependents, were limited in scope and, by law, the military services 
could charge a minimal fee in order to reduce moral hazard (Dependents Medical Care 
Act, 1956). The Secretary of Defense was also enabled to develop health insurance plans 
for inpatient use at hospitals, with beneficiaries responsible for the higher of a $25 
admission fee or a per diem amount for longer stays (Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000). At this 
time the ability to use civilian practitioners did not apply to outpatient services or retirees 
(Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000, p. 6). Table 1 shows the original coverage following 
implementation of the 1956 law. 
  
  8
Table 1.   Baseline military health care in 1956, 
 by source of care and beneficiary status  
(from Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000, p. 7). 
 
 
Changes to the initial beneficiary eligibility in the health care system through the 
1980s and into the early 1990s included spouse eligibility following the death of a service 
member, rights for handicapped children of service members, and the eligibility of pre-
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adopted children and adopted children living with a service member (Dolfini-Reed & 
Jebo, 2000). During the 1980s, active duty members and their dependents were 
approximately 70 percent of the users of military health care services, decreasing to 
around 63 percent as the Cold War ended (Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000, p. 9) (Figure 2). 
As shown in Figure 2, by the year 2000, approximately 55 percent of beneficiaries were 
retirees or dependents of retirees. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Distribution of eligible population by beneficiary type  
(from Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000, p. 10). 
The number of beneficiaries shrank from approximately 9.0 million in the 1980s 
to approximately 8.1 million during the 1990s (Dolfini-Reed & Jebo, 2000, p. 8). That 
trend reversed in the 2000s as eligibility was opened to more individuals and financial 
incentives led more retirees to sign up for TRICARE. Those factors and the high costs 
resulting from the recent wars led to faster growth in military health care spending 
compared to the broader United States economy (CBO, 2014, p. 10). CBO noted average 
annual growth of eligible beneficiaries between 2000 and 2012 of approximately 1 
percent (2014, p.10) (Figure 2). Most of that growth occurred between 2002 and 2003 as 
National Guard and reserve units were mobilized (CBO, 2014, p. 10). Also evident in 
Figure 2 is that the number of retirees and retiree families increased by roughly 500,000 
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or 11 percent during the same period while the level of active duty service members and 
their families remained relatively flat. The growth of the retiree population can partly be 
attributed to the implementation of TFL for retirees, which provides supplemental 
coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees as long as they enroll in Medicare Part B (CBO, 
2014, p. 10). There is no additional fee for retirees to use TFL aside from the annual 
Medicare Part B premium (CBO, 2014, p. 11). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Number of beneficiaries eligible for TRICARE, 2000–2012  
(from CBO, 2014, p. 11). 
The growth in the number of retirees using the TRICARE system is compounded 
by the fact that per capita they use more care than their active duty counterparts, as 
shown in Figure 3. In Figure ,3 use of care is indexed to active duty service members and 
their families, established at one unit as the benchmark. For example, the pharmaceuticals 
column shows Medicare-eligible retirees use 6.5 times the number of 30-day equivalent 
prescriptions per member per year used by active duty service members and their 
families. 
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Figure 3.  Per capita use of TRICARE by retirees and their families 
 relative to use by active duty service members and  
their families, 2010 (from CBO, 2014, p. 12). 
CBO cites the financial incentives as one of the key reasons for increased 
enrollment in TRICARE by beneficiaries (2014, p. 13). According to the CBO (2014,  
p. 13), TRICARE’s fees remained largely unchanged for beneficiaries from 1995–2012, 
while most civilians’ premiums and cost sharing increased in line with per capita health 
care costs nationwide. CBO notes two effects of these lower costs: 1) The relatively low 
rates have led beneficiaries to drop their more expensive civilian plans. 2) The relatively 
lower rates have led to higher use of health services by beneficiaries (2014, p. 13). 
The CBO also analyzed the prices paid by TRICARE beneficiaries, specifically 
retirees, relative to a comparable family Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plan. 
CBO found a military retiree could acquire TRICARE Prime for $520 per year, plus  
$445 in other fees, for total annual expenses of $965. A comparable family HMO would 
run approximately $6,080 per year, or roughly six times the cost to a TRICARE 
beneficiary (2014, p. 13). 
Other factors keeping TRICARE costs low include: 
 Reducing the annual catastrophic cap for TRICARE Standard enrollees 
from $7,500 to $3,000 in the year 2000 
 Eliminating copays for outpatient visits to TRICARE Prime network 
providers for active duty dependents (CBO, 2014, p. 14). 
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DOD estimates that these lower OOP costs led the average individual enrolled in 
TRICARE Prime to use 50 percent more care than the average person in a civilian HMO 
(CBO, 2014, p. 15). The lower OOP expenses coupled with the increasing use of benefits 
led to increasing levels of funding for the DHP. Figure 4 shows the increase in funding 
for eligible TRICARE beneficiaries for the years 2000 to 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Funding for Defense Health Care per eligible TRICARE beneficiary  
(from CBO, 2014, p. 14). 
If DOD’s estimate of increased use of health care services resulting from low 
OOP expenses is accurate, then it may be possible to curb DOD health expenditures by 
altering the incentives for using that care. The idea that OOP expenses are influencing 
health care expenditures is telling, and offers a natural experiment for developing a 
means to curb those expenditures via the use of HDHPs and HSAs. 
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III. COSTS TO BENEFICIARIES OF TRICARE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Today, there are three primary health insurance plans available to individuals 
enrolled in the TRICARE system: TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Standard and TRICARE 
Extra. TRICARE-for-Life is a supplemental plan available to Medicare-eligible retirees 
and has added to the overall cost of military medicine over the last decade, as seen in 
Figure 4, Chapter II. TRICARE Standard allows beneficiaries to be seen by any civilian 
practitioner who accepts TRICARE, with beneficiaries responsible for coinsurance rates 
and an annual deductible. TRICARE Extra provides beneficiaries a network of preferred 
providers available on a case-by-case basis (Stoloff et al., 2002, pp. 2–2). TRICARE 
Prime allows beneficiaries to be seen by a primary care physician at a MTF and functions 
much like a HMO. Each of these programs offers different incentives to beneficiaries. 
1. TRICARE Standard 
There is no enrollment requirement for TRICARE Standard. The plan is available 
to all beneficiaries except active duty military service members (Defense Health Agency, 
2014b, p. 1). Cost to the beneficiary varies by status, with retirees and retiree dependents 
paying more than active duty dependents (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). Rates are 
shown in Table 2. 
Civilian providers may be participating or non-participating with regard to 
TRICARE rates, and this decision can vary from visit to visit (Defense Health Agency, 
2014b, 2014). Participating providers may charge up to the maximum TRICARE 
allowable rates and beneficiaries pay per the schedules in Table 2 (Defense Health 
Agency, 2014b). Non-participating providers are able to charge up to 15 percent above 
the max allowable TRICARE rates, a practice known as balance billing (Defense Health 
Agency, 2014b). If a beneficiary sees a non-participating provider that uses balance 
billing, the beneficiary is responsible for the extra charge, even if the individual’s annual 
catastrophic cap has already been met. Depending on the provider, beneficiaries may 
have to cover their entire visit OOP and then file a claim with TRICARE for 
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reimbursement, while other providers provide filing services on behalf of the patient 
(Defense Health Agency, 2014b). TRICARE Standard offers the most options for 
beneficiaries regarding choice of provider and, as such, carries higher OOP expenses than 
TRICARE Prime or Extra (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). 
Table 2.   Annual deductibles, cost shares and annual catastrophic caps for  
TRICARE Standard (from Defense Health Agency, 2014b). 
 Active Duty Dependents Retirees and Dependents 
Annual Deductible   
E-4 and below $50 / individual 
$100 / family 
$150 / individual 
$300 / family 
(regardless of rank) E-5 and above $150 / individual 
$300 / family 
Cost Share* 20 percent 25 percent 
Annual Catastrophic 
Cap 
$1,000 / family $3,000 / family 
*General rates. Specific percentages for different services can be found in Appendix A. 
 
2. TRICARE Extra 
As with TRICARE Standard, there are no annual enrollment fees for TRICARE 
Extra (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). TRICARE Extra is similar to TRICARE 
Standard in that beneficiaries are able to see civilian physicians; however, beneficiaries 
are restricted to an established network of providers when enrolled in TRICARE Extra 
(Defense Health Agency, 2014b). This network has agreed to accept reimbursement rates 
from the government that are lower than those of non-network providers (Defense Health 
Agency, 2014b). Because the rates paid by the government are lower than those paid to 
non-network providers, cost shares for beneficiaries are lowered to 15 percent and  
20 percent for active duty dependents, and retirees and retiree dependents, respectively 
(Defense Health Agency, 2014b). All other costs remain the same as those listed in Table 
2 (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). Beneficiaries are able to use TRICARE Standard and 
TRICARE Extra interchangeably, with beneficiaries responsible for any associated costs 
depending on which provider they choose (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). A complete 
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breakdown of cost sharing by service rendered under TRICARE Extra is shown in 
Appendix A. 
3. TRICARE Prime 
TRICARE Prime is the last of the three primary TRICARE options and it 
functions much like an HMO in that it requires beneficiaries to be seen by network 
providers. Enrollment in TRICARE Prime is mandatory for active duty service members, 
and it is also open to every other eligible beneficiary with the exception of Medicare 
enrollees. There are no annual premiums for active duty personnel and their dependents 
(Defense Health Agency, 2014a). 
Retirees and retiree dependents pay annual enrollment fees of $273.84 per 
individual or $547.68 per family as of 2014. The annual enrollment fee is applied to the 
annual catastrophic cap of $3,000 for retirees. In addition to these enrollment fees, 
retirees and retiree dependents are responsible for copays for services rendered by 
TRICARE Network providers (Defense Health Agency, 2014a). These network provider 
copays are listed in Appendix B. 
For those opting for TRICARE Prime, Primary Care Managers (PCMs) are either 
assigned to or selected by the beneficiary. Beneficiaries see civilian practitioners only if 
their MTF is unable to provide the required services, usually of a specialized nature, 
unless individuals choose an allowable civilian Prime Network PCM. TRICARE Prime 
covers certain preventative care services for retirees free of charge at MTFs or network 
facilities. There is an option for members to receive point of service care from non-
network providers if they do not have a referral; however the beneficiary is responsible 
for additional charges from providers outside of the network, which by law can be as high 
as 15 percent over the TRICARE allowable charge (Defense Health Agency, 2014a). 
Point of service deductibles are $300 for individuals and $600 for families, and the 
coinsurance rate is 50 percent after reaching the deductible (CBO, 2014, p. 35). These 
fees are not applied to their catastrophic cap (Defense Health Agency, 2014a). 
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4. Supplemental TRICARE Options 
In addition to TRICARE Standard, Extra and Prime, there are supplemental 
options available to beneficiaries. Of the supplemental plans, TRICARE-for-Life (TFL) 
established in 2002 is the largest, at over 2 million enrollees and consumes the most 
resources of the supplemental plans, totaling $8.3 billion in 2013 (Defense Health 
Agency 2014c; CBO 2014). Figure 4 shows that TFL expenses amount to approximately 
$1,000 per year per beneficiary, or approximately $10 billion annually. The DOD makes 
contributions each year to an accrual account established to help ensure that funding 
exists now and in the future for beneficiaries using the TFL option (CBO, 2014, p. 11). 
Those who enroll need to pay only the appropriate Medicare fees to receive the benefit 
(CBO, 2014, p. 10). TFL kicks in after all available coverage from Medicare has been 
used up and acts as a top-off mechanism to minimize the OOP costs for retirees (CBO, 
2014, p. 11). Like the other TRICARE programs, the OOP costs of this program appear 
to provide little incentive for beneficiaries to limit their use of the health care system. 
Relatively lower OOP expenses compared to comparable civilian plans may also reduce 
the incentive to use privately acquired health insurance to bear some of the burdens of 
increased care that come later in life. 
B. COST-SHARING LEGISLATIVE CHANGES FOR TRICARE 
TRICARE Prime enrollment fees remained flat for well over a decade, with fees 
for retired individuals and retiree families at $230 and $460, respectively, from 1995 until 
2011. In 2011, the fees were raised to $260 and $520, respectively, and beginning in 
2012 the fees were indexed to inflation (CBO, 2012, p. 41). Outpatient copayments for 
active duty family members enrolled in TRICARE Prime were eliminated with the 
passing of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 (CBO, 2012, 
p. 41). These copays had been $6 for junior enlisted personnel dependents and $12 for all 
others (CBO, 2012, p. 41). The same authorization was responsible for the reduction of 
the catastrophic cap from $7,500 to $3,000, as mentioned above for TRICARE Standard 
(CBO, 2012, p. 41). 
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Various DOD proposals dating back to 2006 have been presented to legislators to 
increase cost sharing for military retirees using TRICARE as a means to reduce costs 
including raising retiree TRICARE Prime enrollment fees to levels between $1,100 and 
$2,140 from between $230 and $460, increasing charges for office visits under 
TRICARE Prime, introducing enrollment fees for TRICARE Extra and TRICARE 
Standard, and raising annual deductibles for TRICARE Extra and TRICARE Standard 
(CBO, 2012, p. 33). All of these proposals were rejected. However, Congress did approve 
a smaller increase in Prime enrollment fees for FY12 and FY13 bringing the annual fees 
from $230 to $269 and $460 to $539 for retired individuals and families, respectively, in 
FY13 (CBO, 2012, p. 42). 
Despite these increases, beneficiaries continue to pay a lower percentage of their 
health care than they did previously. For example, in 1996 a working-age military retiree 
contributed approximately 27 percent of his or her family of three’s health care costs. 
Today that same individual contributes just less than 11 percent (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014d, pp. 5–10). 
C. BUDGETING FOR HEALTH CARE 
Money for DOD health care is appropriated through the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution process. The Unified Military Health System consists of the 
Defense Health Program (DHP) account, Military Personnel account, Military 
Construction account, and a Health Care Accrual account. Obligation authority falls 
under line item 0130D, Defense Health Program. The DHP consists of three budget 
activities: Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E), and Procurement. 
The O&M portion of the DHP budget requires and consumes the most resources. 
O&M consumed approximately 95 percent of the available resources in 2013 (Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014c). Within the O&M budget activity, 
In-house Care and Private Sector Care make up approximately 75 percent of the total 
O&M line (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014c). The growth 
rate of defense health spending is demonstrated by an analysis of past presidents’ 
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budgets. In 2005, DHP received $18,388,481,000 (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense Comptroller, 2014a). That number grew to $29,058,398,000 by 2010 and in 
2015 has reached $31,994,918,000 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
Comptroller, 2014b; Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014c). These 
numbers do not include the accrual account, which adds to the total, bringing it to 
$38,000,000,000 in FY15 (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014c). 
The accrual account, which falls under the Military Personnel (MILPERS) account, was 
established to fund TFL. DOD makes deposits to the accrual account based upon 
actuarial estimates of dollar amounts required to fund future health benefits for current 
active duty members (CBO, 2014, p. 11). When the Military Personnel and Military 
Construction accounts are added in, the total MHS request for 2015 reaches 
$47,400,000,000, or nearly 10 percent of the defense budget request (Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014c). The total MHS request for 2015 also 
assumes savings to TRICARE from benefit modification proposals, which historically, as 
shown above, have not made it through the Congress. The 2015 MHS budget total aims 
to serve the needs of the current 9.6 million eligible beneficiaries including active duty, 
retired members, retiree families, dependent survivors, and some of the reserve 
component (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, 2014d). Providing a 
more tangible sense of the true cost of care to the beneficiary might support serving the 
needs of the eligible beneficiaries. The remaining chapters evaluate the potential for 
MHS to reduce the quantity of care demanded, and thus overall expenses, by 
implementing HSAs and HDHPs in conjunction with a BAHC. 
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IV. REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following World War II, medical benefits paid to employees were made 
explicitly exempt from income taxes (Baiker et al., 2006). In 1965, the United States 
government introduced legislation providing its poor and elderly citizens medical 
coverage through Medicaid and Medicare (Social Security Acts Amendments, 1965). 
Around the same time theories of risk bearing that were current then were being applied 
to health insurance to determine insurance plans’ optimal design (Feldstein, 1995, p. 29). 
At that time, health care spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) was 
approximately 6 percent in the United States. That number was 13.6 percent in 1995 and 
17.9 percent in 2012, according to the World Bank (The World Bank, 2014). 
B. BACKGROUND 
Kenneth Arrow’s 1963 paper “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care” examined theoretical underpinnings of economics as it applies to the 
health care industry. Elements of Arrow’s research include: 
 Effects of risk aversion  
 Unintended consequences resulting from good intentions  
 The irregular and unpredictable nature of demand for health care  
 The uncertainty of quality and outcomes  
 Asymmetric information  
 Moral hazard  
 Pricing  
 Restrictions on who may practice medicine.  
Relevant to the focus of this thesis, Arrow commented on moral hazard as it relates to 
insurance products. Arrow states, “The physicians themselves are not under any control 
and it may be convenient for them or pleasing to their patients to prescribe more 
  20
expensive medication, private nurses, more frequent treatments and other marginal 
variations of care” (p. 146). Arrow also cited the observation that widespread insurance 
leads to higher demand for health care (Arrow, 2004, p. 146). Nahata, Ostaszewski and 
Sahoo (2005) based their research on the demand side of services on a similar 
perspective, stating, “A low level of consumer participation in purchase decisions affects 
not only the behavior of the consumer (which is the standard moral hazard argument), but 
also the behavior of the health care provider, for whom price increases become the 
natural profit-maximizing route” (p. 90). 
C. HEALTH OUTCOMES AND THINKING ON THE MARGIN 
Cutler (1995) suggests persons previously without health insurance would see 
improved health outcomes as a result of more health spending, while those already with 
insurance saw relatively little effect on their outcomes from spending at the margins (p. 
32). Health outcomes also tend not to vary across reimbursement systems. Cutler notes 
beneficiaries using plans with more cost sharing and thus less care typically do not 
experience worse health outcomes than those with less cost sharing and more care (1995, 
p. 32). Cutler cited Newhouse et al. (1993), Miller and Luft (1994), Staiger and Gaumer 
(1991), Cutler (1995), and McClellan and Newhouse (1994), who all demonstrated the 
relatively small effects of increased health spending on health outcomes. The studies 
indicate that incentives may exist for health insurance beneficiaries to overuse health care 
with little concern for the cost, regardless of whether the expected benefit exceeds the 
expected cost. 
D. ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE 
In 1987, Manning et al. published their analysis of the results of the Rand Health 
Insurance Experiment (HIE). HIE was a five-year experiment testing the consumption of 
health care among families with different health insurance policies with coinsurance rates 
of 0, 25, 50, or 95 percent and upper limits for annual out-of-pocket expenses of 5, 10, or 
15 percent up to a maximum of $1,000. Manning et al. found “The per capita expenses on 
the free plan (no out-of-pocket costs) are 45 percent higher than those on the plan with a 
95 percent coinsurance rate, subject to an upper limit on out-of-pocket expenses” (1987, 
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p. 258). Expenditures for the intermediate coinsurance rates fell in between the two 
extremes. Table 3 contains some of their findings, with standard errors shown in 
parentheses. The results of the HIE study indicate that as price to the patient increases, 
the amount of health care demanded behaves as predicted by economics. 
Table 3.   Various measures of predicted mean annual use of medical services,  
by plan (from Manning et al., 1987, p. 260). 
Plan 
Likelihood of Any 
Use (percent) 





Free 86.7 (0.67) 10.37 (0.420) 777 (32.8) 
Family Pay 
(25 percent) 78.8 (0.99) 8.83 (0.379) 630 (29.0) 
Family Pay  
(50 percent) 74.3 (1.86) 8.31 (0.400) 583 (32.6) 
Family Pay  
(95 percent) 68.0 (1.48) 7.75 (0.354) 534 (27.4) 
Individual 
Deductible 72.6 (1.14) 9.52 (0.529) 623 (34.6) 
 
 Manning et al. (1987) determined price elasticity between -0.20 and -0.10 for 
health care, based upon this data. Van Vliet (2004) in a separate study conducted in the 
Netherlands calculated elasticity to be approximately -0.14 (p. 297). Van Vliet’s research 
appears to contribute additional evidence to the effects of higher deductibles as found by 
Manning et al. (1987). If higher deductibles are capable of reducing consumption of 
health care, it is possible that ownership of funds for medical care may provide further 
incentive to reduce use. If the marginal benefit of the care individuals seek does not 
exceed the marginal cost, as measured by the consumers, then with funds in hand they 
may forgo the additional services and perhaps use those funds when they deem the 
benefits more in line with the costs. 
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF OWNERSHIP AS AN INCENTIVE 
 Herzlinger (2004) noted that consumers did not like being told which practitioners 
they could see and also did not like the idea of gatekeepers whose only job was to “just 
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say no” to referral requests (p. 45). The result was legislation in the late 1990s and the 
beginning of a movement Herzlinger dubbed “Consumer-driven Health Care” in 1999. 
Consumer-driven health care, reasoned Herzlinger, “empowers consumers by offering 
them a wide variety of health insurance plans so they can select the one that most closely 
meets their needs” (2004, p. 45). Consumer-driven health care gained popularity when 
the U.S. Treasury gave health reimbursement accounts tax-exempt status in 2003 
(Herzlinger, 2004, p. 45).  
 Some authors have made the case that HDHPs have the ability to alter consumer 
behavior and lower costs (Herzlinger, 2004; Feldstein, 1995). One of the possible drivers 
behind this behavioral response is that consumers may have a more direct connection to 
the funds they actually expend for health care, likely leading them to think much harder 
about how and for what purposes those funds are used. When OOP expenses are low, 
consumers of health care have little if any incentive not to obtain care because they do 
not bear the financial burden of those services. However, when consumers are faced with 
paying for the marginal cost of that care out of their own pocket, as opposed to the 
insurance company picking up the bill, they may think harder about whether the benefits 
are worth the cost. 
F. HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) 
of 2003 created health savings accounts. HSAs, coupled with HDHPs, offer advantages 
and incentives to promote a more prudent use of health care resources, such as lower 
premiums and taxes, incentives to conserve health care resources, and the ability to 
accumulate the cash savings for use in retirement (DePree & Jude, 2008). Baiker et al. 
(2006) note the importance of HSAs’ ability to reduce the tax bias offered by pre-paid, 
employer sponsored insurance since HSA funds are tax exempt when used to cover 
health expenses out of pocket. Because health insurance is deducted from payroll taxes 
and not included as part of an individual’s taxable income, insurance possesses a tax 
advantage over medical expenses paid for out of the beneficiary’s income, after taxes, if 
that individual is not using an HSA. HSAs function as a tax-exempt (provided 
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contributions are used for health care) savings account owned by the individual. They are 
able to accrue interest, they follow if an individual changes employers, they can be 
withdrawn from for purposes other than health care at age 65 with no penalty aside from 
income tax, and they can be passed on to beneficiaries upon death (Baiker et al., 2006). 
G. HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH POLICY 
The MMA requires a HDHP to establish an HSA. HDHPs must meet certain 
requirements to be used in association with an HSA. A plan must have an annual 
deductible of at least $1,250 for an individual and $2,500 for family coverage as of 2014 
to be considered a HDHP. Annual OOP expenses are capped at $6,350 and $12,700 for 
individual and family coverage, respectively (U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2014). OOP expenses include things such as copays, deductibles and other 
expenses not including premiums. The higher OOP expenses that come with HDHPs are 
covered by funds from the policyholder’s HSA. Annual contribution limits for HSAs are 
the lesser of (1) the deductible and (2) $3,300 for individuals and $6,550 for families with 
these amounts indexed to inflation (Internal Revenue Service, 2014). 
H. MORAL HAZARD REDUCTION 
Table 4 contains data showing how much spending occurs for traditional 
individual preferred provider organization (PPO) plans versus an HSA plan. Figure 5 
displays expected spending distributions based upon the plans presented in Table 4 as 
calculated by Baiker et al. (2006). The lowest curve in Figure 5 represents the percent of 
the population that exceeds the associated dollar amount for total annual health 
expenditures shown on the horizontal axis. The middle curve shows the percent of total 
spending occurring after an individual has reached particular spending levels. For 
example, approximately 40 percent of an individual’s spending occurs after an individual 
has incurred $5,000 in medical expenses. The top curve represents the percent of total 
population spending incurred when total spending is above the associated horizontal axis 
level (Baiker et al., 2006). 
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Table 4.   Characteristics of typical individual health plans:  traditional PPO  








PPO $400 $2,250 15 percent $4,150 
HSA $2,400 $3,400 15 percent $3,106 
 
 
Figure 5.  Coinsurance rates and cumulative health spending distributions  
(from Baiker et al., 2006, p. 467). 
Figure 5 shows that approximately 10 percent of the population spends a total of 
more than $5,000 annually (bottom curve) and that same 10 percent incurs approximately 
70 percent of the total annual expenditures for the population (top curve). To see this, 
begin at $5,000 on the horizontal axis. Going straight up from $5,000 shows that 
approximately 10 percent of the population spends greater than $5,000. Continuing to the 
top curve shows that the individuals who spend over $5,000 account for approximately 
70 percent of total medical spending. Despite the apparent limited effects of HSAs to 
effectively reduce costs when presented this way, Baiker et al. (2006) make three 
assertions: 
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 35 percent of spending occurs between the two deductibles, where PPO 
has only 15 percent cost sharing and HSA has 100 percent; an HSA, 
therefore, is likely to lead to a behavioral response 
 Only a small percentage of the population exceeds its HSA annual OOP 
maximum, usually caused by peculiar, unforeseen events, and an even 
smaller percentage ever exceeds it two years in a row 
 Approximately 50 percent of spending is by those individuals spending 
less than $8,100, well within the cost sharing range of a typical HSA plan, 
leaving room for potential reductions resulting from incentives provided 
by HSA plans (2006, p. 468). 
Baiker et al. made these assertions because “there is significantly more cost-
sharing under the HSA for a substantial portion of spending (2006, pg. 468). Baiker et al. 
(2006) quantified these assertions with their simulation model. Based upon the Newhouse 
et al. (1993) findings from the RAND HIE and assuming an elasticity of demand of -0.20, 
the authors found switching an average risk pool from a PPO policy to an HSA offered 
average potential reductions in health care expenditures of 5 percent (Baiker et al., 2006, 
p. 469). Variations in changes to spending ranged from -20.6 percent to 2.6 percent. 
Baiker et al. (2006) stratified these savings into specific spending ranges to delineate 
where the greatest potential for cost reductions exist across the spending distribution. 
These results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Percent changes in spending across the spending distribution  




















2.4 17.7 33.4 9.0 37.6 100.0 
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The second column shows that approximately 40 percent of the population 
accounts for approximately 18 percent of total spending, and that population is expected 
to reduce spending by 20 percent. Under that assumption, that 40 percent of the 
population has the potential to reduce spending by approximately 3.5 percent. If these 
levels of reductions are possible in the short-term, Baiker et al. argue, it is reasonable to 
expect even larger reductions in the future as health care consumers become accustomed 
to the implementation of health savings accounts and the effects of consumer habits also 
begin to play out on the supply side (2006, p. 471). “Play out on the supply side” refers to 
the idea that with potentially millions of health care “shoppers” comparing prices, 
providers will start advertising prices and competing more on price. 
Cogan, Hubbard and Kessler (2005) calculated that full deductibility of OOP 
health care expenses could have reduced spending in 2004 by 6.2 percent (p. 1447). The 
key to the calculated reduction was an increase in cost sharing. Cogan et al. concluded 
that a rise in the typical coinsurance rate from 25 to 35 percent would increase out of 
pocket spending from $149 to $216 billion (2004 dollars) while private insurance 
spending would fall by $110 billion, to $390 from $500 billion (2005, pp. 1447–48). To 
counter the potential barriers posed by the high deductibles of HSAs for new adopters, 
Cogan et al. proposed giving consumers options and allowing them to “choose the 
deductible level, make trade-offs between deductible and coinsurance amounts, and 
purchase insurance on their own rather than through an employer, all without tax penalty” 
(p. 1450). The proposed BAHC plan attempts to leverage the Cogan et al. (2005) research 
by evaluating a variety of methods for altering the potential incentive structure using 
varying levels of cost-sharing. This analysis is shown in Chapter VI. 
I. INCENTIVE STRUCTURE 
In the late 1970s, the Mendocino County Office of Education established a new 
incentive-based health care program for its employees (Heffley & Miceli, 1998). The 
plan replaced the first dollar plan, a plan that covered any medical expenses incurred  
as long as beneficiaries were current on their premiums, with a new plan with a  
$500 deductible from the same insurer, Blue Shield. Mendocino County placed savings 
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resulting from reduced premiums into side funds for the employees. Employees then used 
the money in the side fund to self-insure for the first $500 of care received. Employees 
were able to accrue their unused annual deductibles, which they could take with them 
upon separation or retirement from the county (Heffley & Miceli, 1998). This provides an 
early example of incentive-based health care. Heffley and Miceli noted mixed reviews 
regarding the plan, depending on the point of view. Generally, they found that employees 
and employers were satisfied, with insurers less so as a result of receiving lower 
premiums to support their risk pool (p. 446). Heffley and Miceli also questioned whether 
only healthy individuals would opt to use them—a phenomena known as self-selection—
thus leaving only less healthy, riskier individuals in traditional plans, leading to higher 
premiums (1998, p. 446). Self-selection is addressed in a subsequent section. 
While the underlying system proposed by Heffley and Miceli does not mirror the 
proposed BAHC, it does offer insights into expected consumer behavior under different 
health plans. Heffley and Miceli noted three plusses of incentive-based health care plans 
like Mendocino County’s: 
 Low use allowed employees to convert unused benefits into cash 
payments 
 More use lowered the rebate to employees, effectively instilling a “shadow 
price” for care 
 The incentive structure might encourage healthier lifestyles, reducing the 
need for care. (1998, p. 446). 
There may be potential for savings by changing the incentive structure for 
individuals regarding their consumption of health care. Researchers have shown 
legitimate price elasticity of demand for health care as well as evidence of reduced costs 
and consumption when OOP costs are increased for individuals (Manning et al., 1987; 
Eichner, 1998). Cutler cited Newhouse et al. (1993), Miller and Luft (1994), Staiger and 
Gaumer (1991), and McClellan and Newhouse (1994) in his discussion of the limited 
effects on health outcomes of increased health care spending on the margin (1995, p. 32). 
With HSAs still relatively new, more research is needed, but the early research indicates 
a reduction in the quantity demanded and thus the cost of health care. 
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J. SELECTION BIAS 
Selection bias results when a disproportionate number of individuals from certain 
groups enroll in a particular insurance plan. For instance, it is reasonable to assume 
healthier individuals expecting to use less health care will be more likely to opt into 
HDHPs coupled with HSAs, as the healthier will be able to accumulate their savings for 
later use while also experiencing lower premiums. The flip side is those individuals 
expecting higher demand for health care services are more likely to select the traditional 
insurance plan due to its more generous coverage and subsequently lower OOP expenses. 
If enough healthy individuals abandon the more generous plan, leaving less healthy 
individuals behind, it is possible that costs may actually increase, with some research 
even noting the possibility of premium spirals so high that the plan collapses (Encinosa & 
Seldon, 2001; Richardson & Seligman, 2007). This researcher has not found any data 
indicating the premium death spiral has been observed in practice. However, the 
importance of the research is the argument that because low risk individuals are likely to 
use more restrictive plans, the ability for healthy individuals’ reductions in spending to 
reduce the total health care expenditures of the population may be limited. Richardson 
and Seligman (2007) noted that high administration costs associated with insurance 
contracts limit the ability of high deductibles to reduce premiums, perhaps leading 
healthy individuals to opt out of group insurance altogether and again leading to the 
adverse selection spiral. 
Economics focusing on incentives and their ability to affect behavior has a 
number of academics believing HDHPs will provide enough incentive to alter peoples’ 
health and lifestyle choices (Herzlinger, 2004; Feldstein, 1995). However, it is possible 
that selection bias is more important in the observations of relatively healthier behaviors 
than is the HDHP itself.  
Kullgren, Volpp and Polsky (2013) studied whether individuals’ health plans 
affected their decision to smoke. While their paper does not focus on an individual’s 
demand for health care based upon lifestyle choices, it does address selection bias in 
HDHPs. Their study focused on three groups of individuals: (1) those with employer-
sponsored insurance with no choice in plan, (2) those with employer-sponsored insurance 
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and a choice of plan, and (3) those individuals with privately obtained health insurance. 
The authors then established the number of individuals with HDHPs and the number 
using traditional insurance plans in each of those groups, while also controlling for other 
variables such as income, race, age, education, location, and marital status. Kullgren et al. 
concluded that enrollment in an HDHP was associated with lower incidence of smoking; 
however, these lower rates were only among individuals with a choice of health insurance 
plan, indicating the presence of selection bias (2013, p. 5). To clarify, when individuals 
had a choice between a HDHP and a traditional PPO plan, non-smokers tended to choose 
the HDHP over the PPO more often than smokers. However, while the effect was 
present, it was not very pronounced. The proportion of smokers in HDHPs was  
75 percent of the proportion of smokers in traditional plans, and with a p-value of 0.02 is 
deemed statistically significant (Kullgren et al., 2013, p. 4). 
Kullgren et al.’s findings indicate that HDHPs may not be as adept at curbing 
unhealthy lifestyle choices as previously argued by Herzlinger (2004) and Feldstein 
(1995). Their findings are also in line with the RAND HIE study that also found 
individuals’ randomly assigned higher deductible policies were not observed to undertake 
healthier lifestyles. These findings may affect the effectiveness of a BAHC because 
primarily healthy individuals will abandon their plans that require premium payments for 
ones where they instead receive an allowance from the government, leaving the 
remaining pool made up primarily of sicker individuals now financed by fewer 
premiums. However, the research of Kullgren et al. (2013) indicates the effect is likely 
not as severe as originally thought. A table with some of the results of their study is found 
in Appendix C. 
A study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2006 by Ryan and Wise 
found evidence of selection bias within the TRICARE system. Based on three studies 
(Jackson-Beeck & Kleinman, 1983; Etter, Perneger, & Rougemont, 1995; Gans & King, 
2004), Ryan and Wise concluded TRICARE Standard enrollees shared common 
characteristics with others opting for fee-for-service care including “a history of high 
medical usage, high incomes, and attraction to services” (2006, p. 53). To come to this 
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conclusion, the authors compared inpatient and outpatient use between TRICARE Prime 
and TRICARE Standard beneficiaries (Ryan & Wise, 2006). 
The underlying statistics of the 2006 Ryan and Wise study have remained stable. 
According to a 2014 TRICARE report, the number of active duty family members, and 
retirees and retiree family members enrolled in TRICARE Standard or Extra has 
remained at approximately 17 percent and 27 percent of the eligible TRICARE 
population (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). The data indicating TRICARE Standard 
beneficiaries use more inpatient care than their Prime counterparts, as noted by Ryan and 
Wise (2006), remains true as of 2014; however, TRICARE Prime enrollees now use 
twice as much outpatient care as their TRICARE Standard counterparts, which is a 
reversal from the Ryan and Wise (2006) findings (Defense Health Agency, 2014c) 
(Figures 7 and 8). Figures 7 and 8 compare MHS beneficiary inpatient and outpatient 
rates of use between TRICARE Prime and non-Prime. Of interest to this study is the 
inpatient and outpatient rate of use by TRICARE Prime enrollees compared to TRICARE 
Standard and Extra enrollees. Figures 7 and 8 show TRICARE Standard enrollees used 
approximately 1.5 times as much inpatient care, while TRICARE Prime enrollees use 
approximately two times as much outpatient care. Also note that with the exception of 
outpatient care demanded by non-Prime enrollees, TRICARE beneficiaries demand a 
significantly higher amount of health care compared to the civilian sector. 
 
Figure 6.  Trend in retiree (<65) health insurance coverage  
(from Defense Health Agency, 2014c). 
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Figure 7.  Inpatient use rates: TRICARE Prime versus TRICARE non-Prime (after 
Defense Health Agency, 2014c) 
 
Figure 8.  Outpatient use rates: TRICARE Prime versus non-Prime  
































































K. ADVERSE SELECTION 
Selection bias is closely associated with adverse selection, the idea that 
individuals have more information regarding their personal health situation than the 
parties insuring them when individuals enroll in an insurance plan. This potentially leads 
to risk pools made up of individuals enrolling in health insurance when they become sick 
and require services and are able to do so without the insurers’ knowledge. Adverse 
selection leads to pools of insured individuals all with high demand for health care, which 
places a strain on the insurance system. Insurance plans need to find a way to encourage 
healthy individuals to enroll, even if they do not expect to use their benefits, in order to 
limit the negative effects of adverse selection. The Affordable Care Act attempts to limit 
these effects by making it mandatory to purchase insurance. 
TRICARE’s lower OOP expense relative to comparable civilian plans leaves the 
insurer susceptible to the effects of adverse selection. Retired individuals not currently 
enrolled in TRICARE who become sick can enroll with no restrictions and no negative 
effects on their premiums. The evidence presented in Figure 6 demonstrates that retirees 
have indeed been abandoning their private insurance for TRICARE over the past two 
decades, with MHS expenditures rising accordingly. 
Adverse selection may have impacts on the implementation of a HDHP option. 
For individuals expecting to be healthy over the near to medium time horizon, the BAHC 
is potentially financially advantageous, as it allows those individuals to accrue funds 
otherwise not available via the allowance to use for future health expenses or to 
potentially withdraw for other uses upon separation from the service. If they do not need 
medical coverage, they will still receive their BAHC from the government for HSA 
contributions. While not a bad thing for beneficiaries, as accrued allowances will insure 
individuals against future medical expenses, health care allowances will increase the 
government’s cost in the near term as they might not have otherwise been required to 
make an outlay. Couple these potentially unnecessary outlays with adverse selection 
among individuals expecting to be sick and thus signing up for the lower cost Prime 
option and costs can add up. As one potential example, the shrinking pool of Prime 
enrollees resulting from departing “healthy” individuals electing to use the HDHP and 
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accept the BAHC leaves only the premiums of the sick to cover their medical costs. The 
government in this scenario would go from funding health care using premiums gathered 
from a pool of healthy and sick individuals, to receiving premiums only from sick 
individuals. Not only would the government not receive the premiums from the healthy 
individuals using the HDHP, but also it would now pay out an allowance to the HDHP 
enrollees, effectively raising the total cost of health care to the government. 
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V. BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HEALTH CARE AS A  
MEANS FOR ALTERING THE INCENTIVES  
OF MILITARY HEALTH CARE 
A. THE CONCEPT 
It has been demonstrated that MHS beneficiaries have continued to use growing 
amounts of health care (see Figure 5) while the relative OOP cost to MHS consumers has 
remained lower than that for comparable civilian care (CBO, 2014). The establishment of 
a Basic Allowance for Health Care for the aforementioned beneficiaries offers one 
potential way to alter the existing incentive structure. A hypothetical structure for a 
BAHC is evaluated in this chapter to determine if it has the potential to improve the 
overall compensation package of the average active duty and retired military member by 
providing more control over the use of their benefits while simultaneously helping to 
curb military health care expenditures. 
The framework is based upon the previously discussed concepts of the economics 
of health care and leverages the results from the Rand HIE and the Baiker et al. (2006) 
studies. The derivation of values for the BAHC is based upon historical spending data for 
the DOD within the MHS (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). Using these derived numbers 
and expected changes in behavior resulting from implementation of the BAHC, such as 
potentially reduced quantity of health care demanded, the potential for savings for the 
DOD and beneficiaries is evaluated. The ability to reduce health care costs for the DOD 
while still being able to maintain, if not improve upon, the benefits package available to 
current and past members of the armed forces is examined from an economic principle 
perspective. 
There are fundamental economic flaws with the development of the HDHP model 
used in this chapter. It is based upon cost and quantity demanded data for an average 
individual within the MHS as reported in the Evaluation of the TRICARE System: 
Access, Cost, and Quality (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). In reality, individual 
insurance demand and individual medical spending are anything but uniform. This fact 
renders the application of averages less than ideal and paints an unrealistic representation 
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of the effects of implementing a HDHP within the DOD. This chapter is meant to provide 
a general explanation of what the implementation of such an insurance plan might look 
like and its ability to generate savings. Various adoption rates are shown to illustrate 
different levels of savings. 
B. STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM 
The BAHC would be established for active duty military members with at least 
one dependent, retirees and retiree dependents. The program would be an available option 
within the TRICARE system alongside Prime, Standard, and Extra, and allow members 
to opt in if they so choose. It is important to note that if members were to elect the HDHP 
they must remain in that plan, and would be unable to swap plans when planned medical 
expenses, such as the birth of a child, are imminent. This restriction reduces the 
occurrence of adverse selection discussed in the previous chapter. Just as with TRICARE 
Standard and Extra plans, there would be no annual premium paid by the beneficiaries. 
Once enrolled in the new plan, beneficiaries would receive a monthly BAHC deposited 
into their HSA based upon the number of dependents in their family. The proposed 
annual BAHC allotments are shown in Table 6. As a starting point for program structure, 
the values for the BAHC allotment are set to one half the annual deductible for active 
duty families and approximately 25 percent of the annual deductible for retirees, 
assuming that one dependent is treated as an individual and more than one dependent is 
treated as a family.  
Table 6.   Annual BAHC allotments by service member status. 
Status Annual BAHC allotment 
Active duty w/ 1 dependent $625 
Active duty w/ 2+ dependents $1250 
Retiree $300 
Retiree w/ 1+ dependents $600 
 
These allowances would be exempt from taxation per HSA tax regulations 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2014). The beneficiary would simply make withdrawals from 
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the account when allowable health care services are obtained, provided they have not 
reached the appropriate annual catastrophic cap. Any unused funds continue to accrue 
until separation from the service or death.  Currently, there is no requirement to close an 
HSA when an individual changes insurance plans, so it would also be possible for the 
member to keep it open and continue to use it to pay for covered expenses upon 
separation from the service or upon reaching age 65. If at any time money from the HSA 
is used for something other than health care, it becomes subject to income taxation, and 
potentially additional financial penalties per IRS regulations (Internal Revenue Service, 
2014). 
C. METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS 
A number of steps were taken to determine the potential savings. Information 
regarding the current OOP expenses for beneficiaries for various levels of medical 
expenditures was calculated for comparison to OOP expenses under the hypothetical 
HDHP. These data provided a benchmark for general differences in costs between the 
various programs for both the government and beneficiaries. The quantity of health care 
demanded was also obtained (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). Quantity of health care 
demanded for inpatient and outpatient visits was extracted from the data and applied to 
the midpoint equation for price elasticity of demand to determine a new quantity 
demanded as a result of price increases. Using the cost per unit of demand for inpatient 
and outpatient care coupled with the potential change in quantity demanded, general 
levels of cost reductions were calculated to determine the overall potential of the program 
to reduce health care costs for the DOD. 
D. DETERMINING COSTS FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF CARE 
The first step taken was to determine the current costs of health care experienced 
by TRICARE beneficiaries. The calculated costs are based on 2014 premiums, 
deductibles, coinsurance rates, and catastrophic caps as applicable under TRICARE 
Prime, TRICARE Standard, TRICARE Extra (Defense Health Agency, 2014a; Defense 
Health Agency, 2014b) and the hypothetical new TRICARE HDHP plan as shown in 
Table 7. In Tables 7, 8 and 9, ADFM represents an active duty member with one 
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dependent, ADFM 2+ represents an active duty member with more than one dependent, 
RET 1 represents a retiree with one dependent, inclusive of the retire, and RET 2+ 
represents a retiree with more than one dependent inclusive of the retiree. 
Table 7.   Premiums, deductibles, coinsurance rates and catastrophic caps used in 
calculating cost of care, $FY14.  
    PRIME STANDARD EXTRA HDHP 
PREMIUM ADFM 1 0 0 0 0 
  ADFM 2+ 0 0 0 0 
  RET 1 273.84 0 0 0 
  RET 2+ 547.68 0 0 0 
DEDUCTIBLE ADFM 1 0 150 150 1,250 
  ADFM 2+ 0 300 300 2,500 
  RET 1 0 150 150 1,250 
  RET 2+ 0 300 300 2,500 
COINSURANCE 
RATE (percent) 
ADFM 1 0 20 15 20 
  ADFM 2+ 0 20 15 20 
  RET 1 0 25 20 25 
  RET 2+ 0 25 20 25 
CATASTROPHIC 
CAP 
ADFM 1 1,000 1,000 1,000 6,350 
 ADFM 2+ 1,000 1,000 1,000 12,700 
  RET 1 3,000 3,000 3,000 6,350 
  RET 2+ 3,000 3,000 3,000 12,700 
 
A simplified calculation of the current OOP costs to beneficiaries using 
TRICARE for various levels of expenditures is shown in Table 8 and Table 9. Table 8 
and Table 9 evaluate a range of total annual medical expenditures from $1,000 to $9,000 
in $2,000 increments and the OOP expenses faced by beneficiaries based on the cost 
sharing data discussed in Chapter III. The cap of $9,000 was chosen given 90 percent of 
the population is expected to spend less than this on an annual basis (Baiker et al., 2006, 
p. 470) as shown in Figure 5. The costs for retirees ignore copays because the data  
does not support the ability to determine if an individual had total medical expenses of 
$1,000 from one visit and thus made only one copay of say, $20, or if that person had 
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$1,000 in total expenses from five visits requiring five different $20 copays (Defense 
Health Agency, 2014c). Ignoring copays increases the difference between observed OOP 
expenses in TRICARE Prime and the HDHP, thus overstating the potential price increase 
resulting from implementation the HDHP. 
Table 8 shows the costs when the HDHP plan is implemented with no annual 
BAHC paid to service members or retirees. Table 9 shows costs when the government 
pays BAHC allotments in accordance with Table 6. The left column shows costs to the 
government for each insurance plan, the second column shows costs to beneficiaries for 
each plan, and the third column shows the percentage of annual health costs paid for by 
the beneficiary under each plan. The fourth column shows the effective OOP cost after 
accounting for the tax-deductible nature of HSA deposits assuming a tax rate of  
15 percent. Table 8 shows that without the allotment of a BAHC beneficiaries would 
incur significantly more costs under the proposed HDHP plan’s deductibles and 
coinsurance rates. Table 9 shows that when the government subsidizes the beneficiary 
with a BAHC allotment, the burden imposed on the beneficiary in terms of percent of 
medical expenses covered OOP would be approximately the same as current TRICARE 
Standard or Extra plans at lower spending levels, and would increase as total medical 
expenses increase, after accounting for tax benefits (a marginal tax rate of 15 percent is 
used for this calculation as that rate is assumed to be the relevant one for the majority of 
military individuals given the tax-exempt nature of some aspects of their pay such as the 
basic allowance for housing). 
The final column of Table 8 and Table 9 shows the percentage of costs covered 
by the beneficiary after accounting for tax deductions resulting from HSA contributions 
made by the beneficiary equal to the amount required out of the beneficiary’s pocket. 
This percentage can be compared to the percent of costs paid out of pocket in TRICARE 
Prime, TRICARE Standard and TRICARE Extra plans in the third column to determine 
the overall cost effects on the beneficiary. The percentage difference between the OOP 
expenses in the HDHP with an allowance compared to TRICARE Standard and Extra in 
Table 9 provides a baseline to help determine the behavior of health care consumers 
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based on the review of previous studies presented above. These differences are shown in 
Table 10. 
Table 8.   OOP expenses to government and individuals across various  
levels of total annual medical expenditures, with percent of  
total expenses covered by individual and effective after tax  




Table 9.   OOP expenses to government and individuals across various levels of total annual 
medical expenditures, with percent of total expenses covered  
by individual and effective after tax OOP costs to individual when paid  




Table 10.   Percent change in OOP expenses of HDHP compared to TRICARE Standard and 
TRICARE Extra for varying levels of total annual health expense. 
  Percent change in price paid OOP 
Standard Extra 
 $1,000 
ADFM (1) -0.39 14.86 
ADFM (2+) -100.00 -100.00 
RET (1) 64.14 85.94 
RET (2+) -28.42 -22.73 
$3,000 
ADFM (1) 15.10 43.51 
ADFM (2+) 36.61 62.77 
RET (1) 36.74 63.80 
RET (2+) 76.54 104.91 
  $5,000
ADFM (1) 16.88 33.19 
ADFM (2+) 48.75 48.75 
RET (1) 17.75 43.25 
RET (2+) 45.51 73.08 
  $7,000
ADFM (1) 50.88 50.88 
ADFM (2+) 82.75 82.75 
RET (1) 8.96 33.51 
RET (2+) 30.19 56.78 
  $9,000
ADFM (1) 84.88 84.88 
ADFM (2+) 116.75 116.75 
RET (1) 3.89 27.83 
RET (2+) 21.06 46.88 
 
E. TRICARE INPATIENT AND OUTPATIENT DEMAND 
The Evaluation of the TRICARE System: Access, Cost and Quality (Defense 
Health Agency, 2014c) has data regarding the levels of use from FY2011–FY2013. 
Average inpatient and outpatient quantity demanded was taken across the entire 
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TRICARE population as described below to establish baseline levels of quantity 
demanded on an individual level. A unit cost was then calculated using annual average 
cost data per individual regarding inpatient and outpatient visits as drawn from the 2014 
Evaluation of the TRICARE System: Access, Cost and Quality (Defense Health Agency, 
2014c). 
1. Inpatient Demand 
TRICARE administrators measure the level of inpatient quantity demanded by 
calculating what is called the Relative Weighted Product (RWP) (Defense Health 
Agency, 2014c). RWP measures the level of cost by factoring in the nursing, technician, 
and facility costs such as room, laundry, administrative, and operating room expenses 
(TMA Uniform Business Office, 2006, slide 6). RWP does not include professional 
services such as doctors’ rounds or inpatient procedures (TMA Uniform Business  
Office, 2006, slide 6). Inpatient quantity demanded as measured by RWP in 2013 was 
133.5 RWP per 1,000 beneficiaries, or 0.1335 per individual (Defense Health Agency, 
2014c). Average annual inpatient costs in 2013 were $857 per beneficiary (Defense 
Health Agency, 2014c). Dividing $857 by 0.1335 RWP puts the cost of one RWP at 
roughly $6,419 in 2011 dollars. A table identifying inpatient demand and expenditure by 
TRICARE plan and provider is included in Appendix D. Multiplying inpatient quantity 
demanded per individual by the approximate 8.03 million beneficiaries who used the 
system in 2013 yields total 2013 quantity demanded of 1.072 million RWP at an 
approximate cost of $6.9 billion. This data is presented along with outpatient data in 
Table 11. 
2. Outpatient Demand 
Outpatient data is measured in a similar fashion. However instead of RWP, 
administrators use Total Enhanced Relative Value Units (RVU) (Defense Health Agency, 
2014c). RVU have a Work component and a Practice Expense component (Defense 
Health Agency, 2014c). “Work RVU measure the relative level of resources, skill, 
training, and intensity of services provided by a physician. Practice Expense RVU 
account for non-physician clinical labor (e.g., a nurse), medical supplies and equipment, 
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administrative labor, and office overhead expenses” (Defense Health Agency, 2014c).1 
Beneficiaries demanded an average of 35.8 RVU overall during 2013 at an average cost 
of $1,897 (FY13) (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). That equates to a cost of roughly 
$52.99 per RVU. Aggregate quantity of outpatient healthcare demanded based on  
8.03 million beneficiaries using the system is approximately 287.5 million RVU at a total 
cost of approximately $15.2 billion ($FY13). A table presenting these numbers by 
TRICARE plan and provider is included in Appendix D. Per unit and aggregate data is 
presented alongside inpatient data in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Individual and aggregate demand for inpatient and outpatient care  
in 2013. 
 Individual Aggregate 
Inpatient .1335 RWP $6,419 / RWP 1,072,005 RWP $6.9B 
Outpatient 35.8 RVU $48 / RVU 287,474,000 RVU $15.2B 
 
F. ELASTICITY OF DEMAND AND POTENTIAL COST REDUCTION 
The elasticity of demand of -0.2 calculated by Manning et al. (1987) using the 
RAND HIE study data has been a value used by economists over the past 25 years 
(Baiker et al., 2006; van Vliet, 2004). The inclusion of additional elasticity values is used 
to establish variations in expected values over a range of possibilities. These expected 
values for change in quantity demanded for health care services are applied across a 
spectrum of potential HSA adoption rates to determine a range of possible potential 
savings for the DOD following implementation of a BAHC. To calculate the change in 
quantity demanded the following equation was used: 
  
where η is price elasticity of demand, %ΔQ is the percent change in quantity demanded 
and %ΔP is the percent change in price. Solving for %ΔQ yields 
  
 
                                                 
1 Identifying outpatient data as RVU may be misleading. Value is a measure of customer satisfaction 
that has little to do with the cost of inputs to each visit. Whether or not a customer is satisfied with the visit, 
resources were still consumed. Perhaps a more appropriate name is relative cost units. 




and rearranging this equation to solve for Q2 yields 
 . 
Table 12 shows the expected change in quantity demanded for inpatient care 
across increases in price ranging from 5 percent to 100 percent and elasticity values 
ranging from -.1 to -.6, measured in RWP. Table 13 shows the same data for outpatient 
care, measured in RVU. These elasticity values cover the range found in multiple studies 
evaluating the effect of price on demand for health care (Manning et al., 1987; Eichner, 
1998). 
Table 12.   Expected change in aggregate quantity demanded for inpatient  
health care across varying elasticity values, 000s RWP. 
   Percentage change in price 
η 5.0 10.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 
-0.6 -32 -62 -150 -280 -394 -495 
-0.5 -26 -52 -126 -238 -339 -429 
-0.4 -21 -42 -102 -195 -280 -357 
-0.3 -16 -32 -77 -150 -217 -280 
-0.2 -11 -21 -52 -102 -150 -195 
-0.1 -5 -11 -26 -52 -77 -102 
 
Table 13.   Expected change in aggregate quantity demanded for outpatient  
health care across varying elasticity values, 000s RVU. 
   Percentage change in price 
η 5.0 10.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 
-0.6 -8,497 -16,746 -40,113 -74,993 -105,603 -132,680 
-0.5 -7,098 -14,023 -33,820 -63,883 -90,781 -114,990 
-0.4 -5,693 -11,273 -27,378 -52,268 -74,993 -95,825 
-0.3 -4,280 -8,497 -20,781 -40,113 -58,141 -74,993 
-0.2 -2,860 -5,693 -14,023 -27,378 -40,113 -52,268 
-0.1 -1,434 -2,860 -7,098 -14,023 -20,781 -27,378 
 
(Q2 Q1) /[(Q1Q2) / 2]  %P
Q2  [Q1(%P  2)] / (2 %P)
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The reduction in aggregate quantity demanded for inpatient and outpatient care is 
combined and adjusted to reflect potential cost reductions available to the DOD under 
varying adoption rates among TRICARE beneficiaries for different increases in price. For 
example, Table 14 shows potential savings for a 5 percent increase in price under various 
adoption rates. Table 15 shows potential savings from a 25 percent increase in price. 
Tables showing 10, 50, 75 and 100 percent adoption rates are found in Appendix E. 
Table 14 and 15 provide a baseline for evaluating changes in quantity demanded 
and reductions in cost under varying scenarios. For example, if elasticity is -0.2, and 
consumer prices are assumed to rise by an average of 5 percent under the hypothetical 
plan with a 10 percent adoption rate, the DOD might see savings of $22.005 million from 
the reduced quantity demanded assuming the same costs per RWP and RVU to the 
government for inpatient and outpatient care. 
Table 14.   DOD savings under various adoption rates when price increases  
by 5 percent across varying elasticity values (000s $FY13). 
  Adoption Rate (percent) 
η 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 50.00 100.00 
-0.6  32,682   65,363   98,045   130,727   326,817   653,634  
-0.5  27,302   54,604   81,906   109,208   273,020   546,040  
-0.4  21,896   43,791   65,687   87,583   218,957   437,913  
-0.3  16,462   32,925   49,387   65,850   164,625   329,250  
-0.2  11,002   22,005   33,007   44,009   110,023   220,046  
-0.1  5,515   11,030   16,545   22,059   55,149   110,297  
 
Table 15.   DOD savings under various adoption rates when price increases  
by 25 percent across varying elasticity values (000s $FY13). 
  Adoption Rate (percent) 
η 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 50.00 100.00 
-0.6  154,288   308,576   462,864   617,152   1,542,880   3,085,761  
-0.5  130,086   260,172   390,258   520,344   1,300,860   2,601,720  
-0.4  105,308   210,615   315,923   421,231   1,053,077   2,106,154  
-0.3  79,932   159,865   239,797   319,729   799,324   1,598,647  
-0.2  53,938   107,876   161,814   215,752   539,381   1,078,762  
-0.1  27,302   54,604   81,906   109,208   273,020   546,040  
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G. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
The goal of the proposed BAHC coupled with a HDHP and an HSA is to put the 
money used to fund first dollar demand of health care into the hands of the beneficiary. 
As reviewed in the literature, using a HDHP plan provides an incentive for beneficiaries 
to think carefully about how and when they spend their health care dollars as they 
become financially responsible for more of their health care decisions. Because they are 
able to accrue unused funds in HSAs, members may make different decisions than they 
currently do regarding the use of their benefit. For example, if they are planning on 
having a baby, they can plan ahead and set aside funds in their HSA to cover future 
obstetrician expenses. Another example might be the simple accrual of a cash balance in 
their HSA for withdrawal upon separation from the service, subject to income taxes. In 
both instances beneficiaries are able to take advantage of the tax benefits of HSAs to 
effectively raise their current level of income and tap a part of their medical benefit 
previously unavailable via the cash payments. It is possible that the beneficiaries’ 
behavior would reduce the amount of health care demanded and, thus, the strain on the 
MHS. 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 show the changes in price faced by beneficiaries in the 
proposed HDHP. There are some important assumptions embedded in those tables, 
including: 
 Preventative care covered under current plans for things such as well-child 
visits, common immunizations, and mammograms is considered 
irrelevant, as it would be covered the same under the HDHP. Therefore, 
the levels of expense used are for demand for medical care outside of 
preventative care visits. 
 The data did not support the ability to extract copays paid by retirees 
across varying levels of care, and have thus been ignored for retired Prime 
enrollees, which should have marginal effects on the study, as those are 
not the members expected to adopt the plan. 
 Coinsurance levels under the HDHP would remain the same as current 
TRICARE Standard amounts of 20 percent and 25 percent for active duty 
and retirees, respectively. 
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As one example, if the entire beneficiary population was told to adopt the 
proposed HDHP and elasticity is assumed to be -0.2, then, as Table 15 shows, there are 
potential savings of $1.079 billion ($FY13) in reduced quantity demanded if prices 
increase by an average of 25 percent. These savings are a result of reduced quantity 
demanded, and may understate the potential savings, because the government would also 
be outlaying less money to cover the cost of care due to the higher cost shares for 
beneficiaries. The case of $3,000 in total annual medical expenses is examined to clarify 
the potential for additional savings. Table 16 shows that under the HDHP, the 
government would spend less than it did under TRICARE Prime, Standard or Extra for 
the first $3,000 in total medical expenses. The left side of Table 16 presents the cost to 
the government under four alternatives: TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Standard, 
TRICARE Extra, and the HDHP. The right side of Table 16 shows the pretax cost to the 
individual under the same four alternatives. Of note, the costs to the individual shown in 
Table 16 do not account for the tax-deductible nature of the HSA, and are thus overstated 
by 17.6 percent. The savings to the government would be in addition to the savings from 
the reduced quantity demanded resulting from the price increase. Examination of Tables 
8 and 9 shows that the government would pay less of the total expenses under the 
proposed HDHP with the exceptions being active duty individual dependents who 
demand less than $900, active duty families who demand less than $1,800, retired 
individuals who demand less than $550, and retiree families who demand less than 
$1,100. 
Table 16.   OOP expense to government and OOP expense to individual of  
first $3,000 in total medical expenses. 
  COST TO GOVT 
PRETAX COST TO 
INDIVIDUAL 
  PRIME STD EXTRA HDHP PRIME STD EXTRA HDHP 
ADFM (1) 3000 2280 2423 2025 0 720 578 975 
ADFM (2+) 3000 2160 2295 1650 0 840 705 1350 
RET (1) 2726 2138 2280 1613 274 863 720 1388 
RET (2+) 2452 2025 2160 975 548 975 840 2025 
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Assuming Ryan and Wise’s (2006) finding that individuals using TRICARE 
Standard self select, a finding that is possibly open to question, the following may be 
more representative of potential savings for the government if the entire TRICARE 
Standard population were to self select into the proposed HDHP plan. In 2013, active 
duty family members using TRICARE Standard or Extra used an average of  
$6,954 dollars of health care, while retirees and their families used approximately  
$9,000 (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). At those total annual medical expenditure 
levels, beneficiaries who elected to use the proposed HDHP would see an effective OOP 
price increase of 83 percent and 35 percent for active duty and retirees, respectively, 
based upon a weighting of 46 percent Standard and 54 percent Extra (Defense Health 
Agency, 2014c). The active duty family members affected comprise roughly 5.3 percent 
of the total population of 8.03 million users in 2013, with retirees’ and their families’ use 
of TRICARE Standard or Extra making up about 11.6 percent, for a total of 
approximately 16.9 percent. The 5.3 percent of active duty dependents’ response to the 
83 percent price increase at an elasticity of -.2 yields potential savings of $179.6 million. 
The response of the 11.6 percent of the population (represented by retirees and their 
dependents) to a price increase of 35 percent at an elasticity of -0.2 yields potential 
savings of $173.5 million. If the entire population currently enrolled in TRICARE 
Standard or Extra chose to opt into the new HDHP plan, potential savings for the DOD 
range from $181.6 million to $954.8 million, depending on the elasticity of demand for 
health care (Table 17). At the generally accepted level of -.2 for elasticity, potential 
annual savings for the DOD are approximately $353.1 million ($FY13). 
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Table 17.   Range of potential savings if entire population currently using  
TRICARE Standard / Extra elected to use the proposed HDHP  
across varying elasticity values, 000s $FY13. 
  Adoption Rate (percent)  
η 5.30 11.60 Total 
-0.6 467,328 487,522 954,850
-0.5 402,825 412,806 815,631
-0.4 333,730 335,646 669,376
-0.3 259,535 255,920 515,455
-0.2 179,653 173,498 353,151
-0.1 93,406 88,241 181,647
 
H. IMPLICATIONS 
The potential for the implementation of a BAHC coupled with a HDHP and an 
HSA depends on many factors, not the least of which involve the associated policies. The 
use of HDHP plans would entail making service members and retirees responsible for a 
larger share of their medical expenses, over 100 percent more than they are currently 
spending in some instances. However, it is possible the average active duty family would 
expend between $1,500–$1,800 ($FY13) and retirees between $2,400–$3,000 in the 
hypothetical HDHP based on average 2013 expenses (Defense Health Agency, 2014c). 
Both the average ranges of $1,500–$1,800 and $2,400–$3,000 are still 51–70 percent less 
than those of their civilian counterparts who on average spent $5,200–$5,900 in 2013 in 
comparable civilian plans made up of pools considered akin to the MHS population, 
whether an HMO like TRICARE Prime, or a PPO, like TRICARE Standard (Defense 
Health Agency, 2014c). 
Other implications include the fact that junior enlisted families would be bearing a 
disproportionate share of the cost increase as compared to their senior counterparts 
relative to their salaries because they BAHC is not based on rank. To avoid this dilemma, 
the BAHC could be higher for lower ranking individuals and decrease in value as rank is 
gained to keep the share of one’s income devoted to health care relatively constant across 
the military population. 
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As a reminder, the accuracy of this model is reduced because the author has 
treated the entire population as average, when in fact it is not when it comes to health 
insurance. This model is meant only to provide a generalized overview of the potential 
effects of such a program. 
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VI. CONSUMER POINT OF VIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter treated all individuals as average and used that assumption 
to develop a model for potential savings from a reduction in quantity demanded as the 
result of increasing the price of health care borne by consumers. This chapter evaluates 
the change in incentives when adopting the hypothetical HDHP from the point of view of 
the consumer. Baiker et al. (2006) presented potential changes in total spending across 
the spending distribution of an average risk pool when those individuals were moved 
from a standard indemnity plan, such as TRICARE Standard, to a HDHP, akin to the 
hypothetical plan presented in the previous chapter. This chapter assumes the TRICARE 
population spending distribution is aligned with the Baiker et al. (2006) study numbers to 
determine a reasonable level of beneficiaries potentially affected by the HDHP and what 
their new spending profiles might look like. This assumption was made because data was 
not obtained regarding the TRICARE population’s spending distribution and the author 
assumes the TRICARE population mirrors the general civilian population. 
As with the last chapter, there are assumptions made for this chapter that may 
have a material effect on the results. First, the researcher is treating the TRICARE 
population as an average risk pool for the purpose of breaking it down into various 
spending components as laid out in Table 5. Second, only individuals currently enrolled 
in TRICARE Standard or Extra are assumed to be interested in the new HDHP, as they 
have already made a rational personal decision to use civilian providers at higher cost to 
themselves. As such, the spending profile under the HDHP is examined relative only to 
the spending profile under TRICARE Standard. 
Applying the information found in Table 5 and the assumptions made above to 
the current TRICARE Standard population yields the spending levels shown in Table 18. 
This table shows only the detail for the $400–$2,400 and $2,400–$9,100 spending levels 
because those are the populations most likely to have a material effect on the ability of 
DOD to reduce health expenditures as discussed by Baiker et al. (2006, p. 469). As a 
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reminder, Baiker et al. (2006) expected the $400–$2,400 group to reduce spending by 
19.6 percent and the $2,400–$9,100 group to reduce spending by 7.7 percent. Their 
reason for higher reductions between these levels of spending is that beneficiaries are 
faced with larger OOP expenses than in the traditional PPO (Baiker et al., 2006). Where 
in the PPO individuals spending $400–$9,100 are above their deductible of $400 and 
paying only the coinsurance rate of 15 percent, in the HDHP they are still below their 
deductible and thus bearing the full cost of care (Baiker et al., 2006, p. 469). The 
increased financial burden provides incentive for consumers to think harder about the 
decision to seek care, and they may only do so if they think they will realize a marginal 
benefit that justifies the increased marginal cost. The deductibles in the hypothetical 
HDHP vary slightly from the values used in the Baiker et al. (2006) study; however, it is 
reasonable to expect similar behavior when spending is between the lower deductible of 
TRICARE Standard and the higher deductible of the HDHP. 
Table 18.   Number of beneficiaries by total medical spending level, from  
current TRICARE Standard / Extra population. 
$400–$2,400 $2,400–$9,100 
Percent of population 39.4 18.5 
# ADFM 167,682 78,734 
# Retirees / Dependents 367,003 172,324 
Total 534,685 251,058 
 
B. ACTIVE DUTY DEPENDENTS 
At the low end of the spending distribution, $400, active duty dependents would 
actually see a decrease in annual OOP medical expenses because the government would 
be providing them with an allowance adequate to cover those costs. In fact, with an 
allowance of $625 from the government, active duty members with one dependent would 
be better off through the first $950 of medical expenses. After the first $950 of total 
medical expenses, individuals would face increased costs in the HDHP as compared to 
TRICARE Standard (Figure 9). Active duty families with more than one dependent who 
elect to use the HDHP and receive a $1,250 annual allowance would be better off through 
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approximately the first $2,000 of uncovered medical expenses. These families would be 
able to accrue a balance in their HSA entirely with funds provided by the government any 
time annual expenses are kept below the family’s BAHC of $1,250. Active duty families 
with more than one dependent would begin to face higher costs in the HDHP when total 
annual medical expenses are above $2,000 (Figure 10). For individuals and families, once 
above the breakeven point, HDHP enrollees would face an increasing share of the cost 
until reaching their annual deductible of $1,250 and $2,500, respectively. Once 
beneficiaries reach the annual deductible, the difference in OOP expenses between the 
HDHP and TRICARE Standard begins declining for a brief range of total medical 
expenditures due to the tax-deductible nature of HSA deposits. This effect is evident by 
observing the decreasing area between the HDHP and TRICARE Standard curves in 
Figures 9–12, after the deductible is reached on the horizontal axis. 
Note that active duty TRICARE Standard beneficiaries, whether individuals or 
families, face a marginal cost of $20 per $100 of care demanded beyond their deductible, 
and reach their catastrophic cap of $1,000 at approximately $4,400 in total annual 
medical expenditures using 2014 TRICARE fee schedules (Defense Health Agency, 
2014b). HDHP enrollees would face a marginal cost of $17.50 per extra hundred dollars 
of health care demanded after reaching their deductible until reaching the catastrophic 
cap of $6,350 for individuals and $12,700 for families, something that does not happen 
until just under $30,000 or $60,000 in total medical expenses, respectively. 
C. RETIREES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 
The economics are different for retirees compared to active duty members as a 
result of higher coinsurance rates and higher catastrophic caps under TRICARE Standard 
and lower allowances paid by the government if enrolled in the potential HDHP. With a 
$300 allowance paid by the government, an individual retired enrollee would be better off 
under the HDHP until reaching $613 of total annual medical expenses (Figure 11). From 
that point until reaching the deductible of $1,250, the beneficiary would pay an 
increasing amount OOP compared to TRICARE Standard, reaching a maximum 
difference of $383 at the deductible. This equates to an increase in OOP expenses of 
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90 percent when total medical expenses are equal to the deductible. Retirees with more 
than one dependent enrolled in the hypothetical HDHP who receive an annual allowance 
of $600 would be better off through the first $1,225 in annual medical expenses. For 
either the individual or family plan, after reaching the deductible, the marginal cost of 
care is $25 per $100 in TRICARE Standard; however, those enrolled in the HDHP would 
be able to take advantage of its tax preference, and pay a marginal cost of $21 per  
$100 of care received. 
 
Figure 9.  OOP expense profile for active duty member with one dependent and a 

























Figure 10.  OOP expense profile for active duty member with more than one 
dependent and a $1,250 annual BAHC ($FY13). 
Retirees, both individuals and those with families, using TRICARE Standard have 
annual catastrophic caps of $3,000 (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). Based on current 
fee schedules, these caps are not reached until there are total medical expenditures of 
approximately $11,500 (Defense Health Agency, 2014b). Catastrophic caps for HDHP 
enrollees would be $6,350 and $12,700, the maximum allowed in 2014 by the Affordable 
Care Act (U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014), and would be 
reached at just under $23,000 and $46,000 in total medical expenses for individuals and 
families, respectively. Figure 11 shows that total OOP expense for individual retirees 
would be the same under either the HDHP or TRICARE Standard at $11,500 in total 
expenditures, while retirees with families would pay more OOP at every point after the 
breakeven point. As a note, retirees would reach their catastrophic caps at lower dollar 
values of total care received in the HDHP compared to their active duty counterparts 

























Figure 11.  OOP expense profile for a retiree with one dependent and a  
$300 annual BAHC ($FY13). 
 
Figure 12.  OOP expense profile for a retiree with more than one dependent  





































The presentation of levels of medical spending by Baiker et al. (2006) is now 
applied to beneficiaries who adopt the HDHP to evaluate the changing incentive structure 
from the beneficiary point of view across the potential spending distribution. Two case 
studies are presented to examine the potential effects of such a change on beneficiaries: 
active duty members with one dependent and retirees with more than one dependent. 
1. Active Duty with One Dependent 
Chapter VI, Section B showed that active duty members with one dependent 
electing to use the HDHP would experience lower OOP expenses for the first $950 of 
medical care received. Table 5 showed that 36.6 percent of the population spends less 
than $400 annually on health care. If this level holds true for active duty members with 
one dependent, then 36.6 percent of that population enrolled in the HDHP would be able 
to pocket at least $200 (the difference between their allowance and their expenditures) 
annually in their HSA and would have that available for future health care expenses. 
Individuals not requiring care outside of normally covered preventive services would 
likely be able to continually accrue their balances from year to year, barring unexpected 
health expenditures, which is exactly how insurance is designed to function. 
The 39.4 percent of the population that spends $400–$2,400, shown in Table 5, 
would face different incentives than they do in TRICARE Standard, depending on where 
those beneficiaries fall between those two values. From $400–$625, the beneficiary 
would pay for care using funds from the HSA provided by the government. As above, if 
those beneficiaries are able to keep total expenses below $625, they would be able to 
accrue unused funds. From $625–$950 individual active duty dependent beneficiaries in 
the HDHP would still better off, even as they begin to use their own funds to pay for 
care; however, once spending exceeds $950, beneficiaries would begin paying an 
increasing percentage of their health care expenditures. The increase in OOP expenses for 
the HDHP compared to TRICARE Standard peaks at 43.5 percent when total annual 
health spending is at the HDHP deductible of $1,250. Between $1,250 and $2,400  
the difference between the HDHP and TRICARE Standard OOP expense narrows to  
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21.1 percent as a result of the tax-favored status of the HSA funds used to pay for care 
under the HDHP. 
The changes that occur between $400–$2,400 may alter consumer behavior on the 
margin because those changes should lead them to think more carefully about the 
marginal costs and marginal benefits of their health care decisions. Beneficiaries, 
knowing they would be responsible for a higher percentage of their total health care 
expenditures between $950 and $2,400, may think differently about how they spend 
between $625–$950 in an effort to preserve funds for future use that may provide higher 
value returns. Baiker et al. (2006) concluded that when consumers were faced with full 
cost sharing (i.e., between $625–$1,250 in this hypothetical plan), they reduced their total 
medical spending by nearly 20 percent. The increase in price from $1,250–$2,400 ranges 
from 43.5 percent at $1,250 down to 21.1 percent at $2,400, so it may not reduce 
spending behavior as drastically as the full cost sharing up to the deductible. However, 
there would possibly be some reduction in quantity demanded in response to the price 
increase as shown in the literature review. Assuming an elasticity of -0.2, the percentage 
decrease in quantity demanded as a result of these price increases may range from 8.7 to 
4.2 percent, respectively. 
Total spending between $2,400 and $9,100 for an active duty member with one 
dependent is now examined. Baiker et al. (2006) posited that people at these levels of 
spending constituted 18.5 percent of the population. The difference in OOP expenses 
between the HDHP and TRICARE Standard continues to decline from 21.1 percent at 
$2,400 to a minimum of 6.7 percent at $4,400 of total spending, the point at which a 
TRICARE Standard beneficiary reaches the annual catastrophic cap. In the HDHP, 
between $4,400 and $9,100 the beneficiary would face a marginal cost of care of $17.50 
per $100 of health care services demanded and the difference in OOP expenses begins to 
increase, peaking at 635 percent when an individual in the HDHP reaches the annual 
catastrophic cap. For reference, $9,100 in total annual health expenditures would require 
OOP expenses of $1,866 in the HDHP, or an increase of 86 percent over the same level 
of spending in TRICARE Standard. To reach the maximum OOP expense of $6,350 in 
the HDHP requires total annual spending of $30,000. Baiker et al. (2006) stated that just 
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5 percent of the population is expected to have spending exceed $9,100 in any given year, 
so these price levels would likely affect only a very small percent of the population. The 
percent differences in OOP expenses between the HDHP and TRICARE Standard are 
summarized in Table 19. 
Table 19.   Percent differences in OOP expense in HDHP versus TRICARE Standard for 
active duty service members with one dependent across varying levels of total 
annual medical expenses with a annual BAHC of $625. 
Total Annual Medical Spending Percent Change in OOP Expense 
$0 - $625 -100 
$626 - $950 -100 to 0 
$951 - $1,250 0 to 43.5 
$1,251 - $4,400 43.5 to 6.7 
$4,400 - $9,100 6.7 to 86 
$9,100 - $30,000 86 to 635 
 
Alternative versions of the HDHP provide a means of shaping the spending 
profile. Varying the level of the health allowance or altering the coinsurance rate controls 
the level of OOP expenses faced by a beneficiary. For example, if the annual BAHC is 
increased by $75, from $625 to $700, an active duty member with one dependent would 
spend the same amount OOP for the first $4,400 in total care that he or she did while 
using TRICARE Standard. The difference is that after initially being better off in the 
HDHP, the beneficiary would be faced with higher costs under the HDHP for total 
expenditures between $1,100, the indifference point between the two plans, and $4,400. 
The negative price elasticity of demand for health care should cause a reduction in the 
quantity demanded over this range of total annual health spending. 
This effect is shown in Figure 13, where the HDHP spending profile is now 
tangent to the TRICARE Standard profile when total annual health spending is $4,400. 
While not the subject of this case study, a similar effect can be achieved by increasing the 
annual BAHC for an active duty member with more than one dependent from $1,250 to 
$1,500. In both cases, increasing the BAHC would allow even more room for service 
members to potentially accrue unused allowances in their HSA for medical expenses that 
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may arise in subsequent years, reducing their OOP burden when they might need it most; 
or, if these funds are not required prior to separation from the service, allowing them to 
tap a benefit previously unavailable by taking unused health allowances with them as 
they enter the civilian sector.  
This is all accomplished with a vast majority of the beneficiary population likely 
facing OOP increases for total annual health expenditures of no more than 43.5 percent, if 
Baiker et al.’s (2006) assumptions regarding spending levels are accurate. Beneficiaries 
would be able to deposit their own funds into their HSAs to take advantage of tax 
deferment and plan for future medical expenses if they desire. These deposits would 
lower their tax bills and effectively increase their annual income, improving their 
compensation, especially if they are able to remain healthy and accrue balances in their 
HSA. 
 
Figure 13.  OOP expense profile for active duty member with one dependent and a 























2. Retirees with Families 
Retirees enrolling in a family HDHP would receive an annual BAHC of $600 and 
would be better off through the first $1,100 in total health spending. The BAHC of  
$600 would allow them to accrue funds any time total annual health expenses are below 
that level. A $600 BAHC results in the spending profile, shown in Figure 12, where, after 
reaching the indifference point, $1,100 in this case, beneficiaries would be required to 
spend more OOP in the HDHP compared to TRICARE Standard for any further annual 
medical expenses. 
Just as before, adjusting the annual BAHC or the coinsurance rate can alter the 
spending profile. For the case of a retiree with a family, increasing the annual BAHC by 
$500, from $600 to $1,100 results in an indifference point between the HDHP and 
TRICARE Standard of $1,950 in total annual health expenditures and the same OOP 
expenses for the first $11,100 of care, the level where a TRICARE Standard enrollee hits 
his catastrophic cap. 
Again, families would be faced with a higher share of the costs at lower spending 
levels between the indifference point and their HDHP deductible of $2,500. This increase 
in the marginal cost of care at lower levels should alter these families’ thinking on the 
margin and reduce the quantity of health care they demand. For example, with a BAHC 
of $1,100, after reaching the indifference point between TRICARE Standard and the 
HDHP at $1,950 of total annual health spending, retirees would see marginal costs 
increase 5.5 percent at $2,000 to 40.0 percent at the deductible of $2,500. With a price 
elasticity of demand of -0.2, these price increases might reduce quantity of health care 
demanded by 1.1 percent to 8.0 percent. Just as with the active duty case study, not many 
members are expected to spend in excess of $9,100 in any given year, limiting the 
downside for a large majority of the population. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The goal of the hypothetical HDHP is to place more financial responsibility for 
health care into the hands of consumers in order to alter their thinking on the margin by 
increasing marginal costs earlier in the spending profile and reducing moral hazard. 
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There are many ways of establishing a HDHP in order to achieve these ends. This section 
has discussed just a few of the possibilities. It was demonstrated that by varying different 
aspects of a HDHP coupled with a BAHC, financial incentives are altered in ways to 
invoke a behavioral response regarding quantity of health care demanded. Ideally, the 
goal would be lowering total medical expenditures for the MHS. Other options to alter 
the structure of the HDHP not discussed in this section include altering the catastrophic 
caps or changing the coinsurance rates. Each of the options can be manipulated in ways 
to align hypothetical OOP expenses with current plans, while altering the spending 
profile enough to perhaps achieve a behavioral response. 
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VII. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This paper has attempted to achieve two goals. The first was to quantify the 
potential savings to the DOD resulting from the implementation of a BAHC coupled with 
a HDHP and a HSA, from the expected reduction in quantity of health care demanded. 
The second was to conduct an economic analysis of the changes to the TRICARE 
incentive structure resulting from implementation of a HDHP from the standpoint of the 
beneficiary. 
B. FINDINGS #1 
The proposed HDHP does not appear to offer significant cost savings to the DOD 
at expected rates of adoption. The hypothetical HDHP is designed to place more 
responsibility for health care expenses on the consumer earlier in his spending profile in 
order to generate behavioral responses. Values for elasticity of demand for health care 
were applied to average annual quantity demanded for health care from the MHS 
population to determine potential savings to the DOD. While these values were applied to 
average expenses, and are, therefore, not an ideal representation of actual savings, they 
provide a starting point for analyzing the potential of such a program. 
There are a number of factors affecting the implementation and success of  
such a health care plan. For example, adoption rates, selection bias, and overall price  
increases are a few factors. It was shown in Chapter V that the DOD could save as much 
as $10 billion (FY13), or approximately 20 percent of the MHS budget, annually in 
reduced quantity demanded (only if the entire MHS beneficiary population enrolled); 
however, the expected value is more likely to be between $10 million and $50 million 
(FY13), or 0.02 percent and 0.10 percent of the total MHS budget. There is a difference 
between the potential savings and the expected savings because only those who have 
already made a rational decision to enroll in TRICARE Standard are assumed to be 
willing to adopt a HDHP and not all of that population would be expected to adopt the 
program. Recall Chapter V assumed the entire TRICARE population to be average, so 
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the theoretical $10 billion is an overstatement resulting from that assumption. After 
accounting for implementation costs and other administrative expenses, the range of 
savings will likely decrease further. Ultimately, unless widespread adoption of a HDHP is 
pressed upon the population, it appears that the ability of this particular program to 
generate significant savings by reducing quantity demanded among a small percentage of 
the population is limited. 
C. FINDINGS #2 
The second objective, an economic analysis of the effects of such a plan on 
beneficiaries and their potential behavioral response, shows promise as a means for 
altering health care incentives faced by beneficiaries. Increasing marginal costs for care 
to earlier points in the spending profile should reduce individuals’ total health 
expenditures by reducing moral hazard, as demonstrated in chapters V and VI. Based on 
previous studies, the increases in marginal cost achieved under the hypothetical HDHP 
may reduce total health expenditures by as much as 20 percent. 
The hypothetical HDHP coupled with a BAHC provides one means for altering 
those incentives, and the various adaptations of the HDHP evaluated demonstrated the 
flexibility of the program. Shifting BAHC levels, deductibles, and catastrophic caps 
provides a means for policy makers to adapt the policies to fit a wide range of 
beneficiaries. There are many ways to increase the marginal cost for care at lower levels 
of health expenditures while keeping total OOP expenses in line with current levels under 
TRICARE Standard. Each beneficiary category is different and may very well require a 
different set of allowances, deductibles, coinsurance rates, and catastrophic caps to find 
optimal plans for both the beneficiary and the MHS. Note that designing the new plan to 
keep OOP expenses in line with current levels limits its effectiveness at reducing costs. 
Adaptations limiting OOP were shown to demonstrate possibilities that may be more 
palatable to policy makers. 
For a program like this to be effective requires policy shifts among leadership 
regarding the acceptable level of cost sharing by the MHS population. Ultimately, as 
originally presented with allowances of $625 and $1,250, and catastrophic caps of  
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$6,350 and $12,700, for active duty members with one dependent and active duty 
families, respectively, the HDHP leaves beneficiaries responsible for potentially much 
higher annual OOP medical costs. The situation is the same for retirees and their family 
members, though the increases were not as severe, as they already have higher 
coinsurance rates and catastrophic caps. Because the BAHC is deposited into 
beneficiary’s accounts, which may provide a sense of ownership of those funds, the 
perceived cost shift could be considered even larger. Previous studies cited, however, 
demonstrated that 95 percent of the population is not expected to fall into categories 
requiring high levels of OOP expense. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The TRICARE system has become an increasing strain on the DOD budget, 
growing from 4 percent of defense spending in 1990 to approximately 9 percent in 2014 
(CBO, 2014, p. 2). CBO projects that health spending will account for approximately  
11 percent of defense spending by 2028 (2014, p. 2). This is partly the result of 
legislation that has continually expanded benefits while only minimally, if at all, 
increasing costs borne by beneficiaries. As the civilian population deals with the 
increasing costs of health care, health care insurers have been shifting the rising costs of 
health care onto consumers as the costs for such care have continued to rise. HDHPs are 
becoming an increasingly more popular means of shifting the increase in costs. 
The America’s Health Insurance Plan (AHIP) Center for Policy and Research 
reported that “the number of people with HSA / HDHP coverage rose to more than  
13.5 million in January 2012, up from 11.4 million in January 2011, approximately  
10 million in January 2010, 8 million in January 2009 and 6.1 million in January 2008” 
(2012, p. 1). They also reported that by 2012, 59 percent of individuals covered by HSA-
qualified plans were in large group plans (2012, p. 7). AHIP also cited a 2009 Cigna 
study that “found slower growth of health costs among consumer-driven health plans” 
(2012, p. 3), with reductions of 7 percent for hypertension, 8 percent for diabetes and  
21 percent for joint disease (2012, p. 9). Additionally, among individuals who had HSAs 
for more than one year in 2011, 72 percent rolled over unused funds from one year to the 
  68
next; of the remaining 28 percent, 15 percent did not know if they had, so the number 
rolling over funds may be higher than 72 percent (AHIP, 2012, p. 12). While the 
implementation of HDHPs and HSAs may appear daunting because of the potential for 
increased costs to beneficiaries, if the AHIP report is accurate, HDHPs and HSAs appear 
to be working in the civilian sector. As more individuals and families grow accustomed 
to the structure and inner workings of HDHPs and HSAs, the number of individuals and 
families using such plans may continue to grow. The growth in the number of individuals 
using HDHPs may offer a natural experiment for the DOD to evaluate the plans’ 
effectiveness at reducing health care expenditures. In the meantime, it is recommended 
that DOD should consider a pilot program to evaluate the overall effects of such a plan  
on the level of health care used by individuals, as well as its effects on their overall 
compensation. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study has evaluated one potential solution for reducing health care costs for 
the DOD. It applied a systematic approach to the entire MHS population to determine the 
savings potential. Specific spending data for the MHS population is required to develop a 
more accurate model of potential savings, as such data would allow researchers to test for 
self-selection and better account for its effects. The calculations were based on data 
derived from the RAND HIE conducted in the 1970s. No study of that scope has been 
conducted since then, leaving open the possibility that results from a new study may 
prove to be entirely different. Also, while this research focused on the application of a 
HDHP with an HSA and a BAHC, various aspects of this idea may have merit when 
applied independently under different systems. Evaluation of income elasticity of demand 
for health care may provide insight as to the adoption of a graduated scale for the BAHC. 
Akin to the basic allowance for housing, a graduated scale could be used in order to 
develop a more level playing field for health care costs as a percent of beneficiary 
income. 
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APPENDIX A. TRICARE STANDARD AND TRICARE EXTRA 
HEALTH CARE COSTS  
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APPENDIX B. TRICARE PRIME NETWORK PROVIDER COPAYS 
Table 21.   Costs for retirees, their families and all others  
(from Defense Health Agency, 2014a, p. 5). 
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APPENDIX C. CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATELY INSURED 
U.S. ADULTS BY PLAN TYPE 
 
Figure 14.  Characteristics of privately insured U.S. adults by plan type, 2007–2008  
(from Kullgren et al., 2013, p. 4). 
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APPENDIX D. INPATIENT AND OUTPATIENT USE AND COSTS 
BY BENEFICIARY STATUS 
 
Figure 15.  Average annual inpatient RWP per 1,000 beneficiaries by FY (from 
Defense Health Agency, 2014c, p. 76). 
 
 
Figure 16.  Average annual DOD inpatient costs per beneficiary by FY (from Defense 
Health Agency, 2014c, p. 77). 
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Figure 17.  Average annual outpatient RVU per beneficiary by FY (from Defense 
Health Agency, 2014c, p. 81). 
 
 
Figure 18.  Average annual DOD outpatient costs per beneficiary by FY (from 
Defense Health Agency, 2014c, p. 82). 
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APPENDIX E. DOD SAVINGS RESULTING FROM DIFFERENT 
PRICE INCREASES FOR VARIOUS ADOPTION RATES ACROSS 
VARYING VALUES OF ELASTICITY 
Table 22.   DOD savings under various adoption rates when price increases by 10 percent 
across varying values of elasticity (000s $FY13). 
  Adoption Rate (percent) 
η 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 50.00 100.00 
-0.6  64,412   128,823   193,235   257,646   644,115   1,288,230  
-0.5  53,938   107,876   161,814   215,752   539,381   1,078,762  
-0.4  43,362   86,724   130,086   173,448   433,620   867,240  
-0.3  32,682   65,363   98,045   130,727   326,817   653,634  
-0.2  21,896   43,791   65,687   87,583   218,957   437,913  
-0.1  11,002   22,005   33,007   44,009   110,023   220,046  
 
Table 23.   DOD savings under various adoption rates when price increases by  
50 percent across varying values of elasticity (000s $FY13). 
  Adoption Rate (percent) 
η 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 50.00 100.00 
-0.6  288,452   576,903   865,355   1,153,806   2,884,516   5,769,031  
-0.5  245,718   491,436   737,154   982,872   2,457,180   4,914,360  
-0.4  201,042   402,084   603,126   804,168   2,010,420   4,020,840  
-0.3  154,288   308,576   462,864   617,152   1,542,880   3,085,761  
-0.2  105,308   210,615   315,923   421,231   1,053,077   2,106,154  
-0.1  53,938   107,876   161,814   215,752   539,381   1,078,762  
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Table 24.   DOD savings under various adoption rates when price increases by 75 percent 
across varying values of elasticity (000s $FY13). 
  Adoption Rate (percent) 
η 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 50.00 100.00 
-0.6  406,187   812,374   1,218,561   1,624,748   4,061,869   8,123,738  
-0.5  349,178   698,356   1,047,535   1,396,713   3,491,782   6,983,564  
-0.4  288,452   576,903   865,355   1,153,806   2,884,516   5,769,031  
-0.3  223,631   447,262   670,893   894,524   2,236,310   4,472,620  
-0.2  154,288   308,576   462,864   617,152   1,542,880   3,085,761  
-0.1  79,932   159,865   239,797   319,729   799,324   1,598,647  
Table 25.   DOD savings under various adoption rates when price increases by 100 percent 
across varying values of elasticity (000s $FY13). 
  Adoption Rate (percent) 
η 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 50.00 100.0 
-0.6  510,337   1,020,675   1,531,012   2,041,350   5,103,374   10,206,748  
-0.5  442,292   884,585   1,326,877   1,769,170   4,422,924   8,845,848  
-0.4  368,577   737,154   1,105,731   1,474,308   3,685,770   7,371,540  
-0.3  288,452   576,903   865,355   1,153,806   2,884,516   5,769,031  
-0.2  201,042   402,084   603,126   804,168   2,010,420   4,020,840  
-0.1  105,308   210,615   315,923   421,231   1,053,077   2,106,154  
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